An alternative to signaling: directed search and substitution by Levy, Matthew & Szentes, Balázs
  
Matthew Levy, Balázs Szentes 
An alternative to signaling: directed search 
and substitution 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Levy, Matthew and Szentes, Balázs (2016) An alternative to signaling: directed search and 
substitution. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. ISSN 1945-7669 
 
© 2016 American Economic Association 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66148/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
An Alternative to Signaling: Directed Search and
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Matthew Levy† and Bala´zs Szentes‡
November 23, 2015
Abstract
This paper analyzes a labor market, where (i) workers can acquire an observable
skill at no cost, (ii) firms differ in unobserved productivity, (iii) workers’ skill and firms’
productivity are substitutes and (iv) firms’ search is directed. The main result is that,
if the entry cost of firms is small, no worker acquires the skill in the unique equilibrium.
For intermediate entry costs, a positive measure of workers obtain the skill, and the
number of skilled workers goes to one as entry costs become large. Welfare is highest
when the entry cost is high.
1 Introduction
Signaling theory is often used to explain seemingly inefficient investments. The peacock’s
large and colorful tail is often explained as a costly signal from males with high but unob-
servable reproductive value (Zahavi, 1975). In the context of economics, individuals might
invest in education in order to signal their high ability to the labor market (Spence, 1973).
This paper puts forward a model which predicts inefficient investments of a different kind.
Our central departure is that workers’ ability is a substitute for, rather than a complement
of, firms’ productivity. Workers may costlessly acquire (or, more provocatively, destroy) a
skill which is perfectly observed by potential firm matches. Rather than acquire the pro-
ductive skill, workers may strategically decide to remain low-ability types in order to avoid
a poor match.
We analyze a model with many workers and many firms. Workers must decide whether
to acquire a productive skill at no cost. At the same time, firms must decide whether to enter
∗We have benefited from comments by John Geanakoplos, Stephen Morris, Andrew Postlewaite, Phil
Reny, Joel Sobel, and especially Jeff Ely.
†Department of Economics, London School of Economics. Email: m.r.levy@lse.ac.uk
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the market at some positive cost. Entering firms then draw a stochastic productivity. The
skill of a worker is observable, and an entrant firm can direct its search towards a particular
type of worker. We consider a stark version of a directed search model, where there are two
markets, one for skilled workers and one for unskilled ones. In each market, the maximum
number of matches are then created.1 The surplus created by a match is equally shared by
the worker and the firm. Our key assumption is that the productivity of the firm and the
skill of the worker are substitutes.
Our main result is that if the firms’ entry cost is low, no worker acquires the skill. The
intuition behind this result can be explained as follows. Suppose that some workers acquire
the skill. Since skilled workers generate larger surplus than unskilled workers, there will be
more excess demand for skilled workers. Therefore, firms entering the market for skilled
workers face a more severe search friction than those firms who search for unskilled workers.
Since a worker’s skill and a firm’s productivity are substitutes, more productive firms are less
willing to endure this search friction. There will be a productivity cutoff below which firms
search for skilled workers and above which firms search for unskilled workers. Conditional
on being matched, then, a worker is better off in the low-skill market.2 To attract any
skilled workers, the match probability must be sufficiently higher in the high-skill market
than in the low-skill market. When the entry cost is low, however, there will be enough
firms entering to guarantee a match for even low-skilled workers. As a consequence, workers
have no incentive to obtain the skill.
Our second result is that for higher firm entry costs, there exists a unique equilibrium,
in which some workers acquire the skill. All skilled workers are matched with a firm, while
some unskilled workers remain unmatched. In equilibrium, the highest productivity firms go
to the low-skill market where they are matched with probability one. This sorting explains
the inefficient investment in skills by workers, as they are willing to remain unskilled (and
potentially unmatched) in order to avoid the low-productivity firms in the high-skill market.
We then show that when entry costs are sufficiently high, all workers obtain the skill.
That we obtain inefficient investment in the skill may superficially resemble the typical
(inefficient) separating equilibrium in signaling models of education. However, our model is
in many ways opposite. For example, Spence (1973) and related models generate inefficiency
through over-investment in costly but non-productive education because of its signaling
value. Instead, here inefficiency comes through the under-investment in costless (or even
negative-cost) but productive education because of the substitutability of worker and firm
productivity. Furthermore, unlike in signaling models, inefficient investments are made by
1This assumption captures the idea that it is more costly to search for a type which is more demanded.
Search in our model is more strongly directed than in, for example, Shi (2002) where a “high-tech” firm’s
strategy may be to match with both skilled and unskilled workers with positive probability.
2We will assume that the productivity of a skilled worker is not too high relative to that of an unskilled
worker.
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the side of the market whose type is observable.
Because we consider non-transferable utility, our result does not follow from the previous
literature which has focused on the link between negative assortative matching and submod-
ularity of the production function in settings with transferable utility (e.g. Atakan (2006);
Shimer and Smith (2000); Becker (1973, 1974)). In such settings, submodular production
technology leads to negative assortativity because high-ability workers’ marginal product —
and hence their share of the surplus — is higher in a low-ability match. In fact, we shall ar-
gue that workers would acquire the skill if utilities were perfectly transferable in our model.
Instead, we assume that the surplus from any match is shared equally, which means that
workers focus on their total rather than marginal product. In models with non-transferable
utility such as Smith (2006), monotonicity of preferences — i.e., all types prefer matching
with higher types than lower types — guarantees that equilibrium matches are never neg-
atively assortative.3 We show that frictions from directed search can nevertheless result in
high-quality firms matching with low-ability workers.
It is an open question whether firms’ and workers’ productivity are complements or
substitutes in production. Most empirical research takes complementarity as given (Postel-
Vinay and Robin, 2002; Krusell et al., 2000; Goldin and Katz, 1998). Our results suggest
that this assumption rests on firm theoretical ground, since in markets with cheap entry
workers will never invest in skills which are substitutes for firm productivity.
Finally, we note that our paper was motivated by the work of Mailath and Postlewaite
(2006). They consider a population of men and women who, each period, are matched and
produce offspring. Agents differ in their non-storable endowments, and care about the con-
sumption of their descendants. In addition, some agents have a particular physical attribute,
such as blue eyes, which is inherited by offspring. There exist equilibria in which the attribute
has a value – that is, agents with the attribute are better off than agents without it. In
this type of equilibrium, high-endowment agents without the attribute prefer to match with
low-endowment agents with the attribute rather than with high-endowment agents without
it. Such preferences arise from risk-aversion among agents; high-endowment individuals are
willing to forgo present consumption in order to increase the expected consumption of their
offspring by equipping them with the attribute. In other words, the biological attribute is
used to transfer wealth to future generations. In our setup agents are risk-neutral, so they
have no incentive to transfer wealth across periods. In Mailath and Postlewaite (2006),
individuals who are not endowed with the attribute consume less than others. Since re-
production is unaffected by consumption, the frequency of the attributes are constant over
time. We observed that if reproductive value would be determined by consumption, the
valued attribute would be more and more frequent in the population and could not be used
3In addition, log-supermodular production guarantees strict positive assortativity. While we will assume
log-submodular production, preferences are clearly monotonic.
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to transfer wealth across generations. In other words, the frequency of attributes can only
be stable in the population if the valued attribute is biologically disadvantageous. Indeed,
our original motivation was to try to develop a theory whereby a disadvantageous attribute
could survive evolution. In a biological version of our model, it can be shown that a dis-
advantageous male trait, e.g. the peacock’s tail, can survive evolution if it is substitutable
with female fitness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives prelim-
inary results. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium for low, intermediate, and high entry
costs, and presents an example for exposition. Section 5 considers the welfare implications
of the model, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a labor market setting with a unit mass of workers and an unlimited number
(continuum) of firms. There are two time periods. In the first period, workers decide
whether to acquire a skill and simultaneously firms decide whether or not to enter. The
type of a skilled worker is denoted by H and the type of an unskilled worker is denoted by
L. Acquiring the skill is free but the entry cost of a firm, c, is strictly positive. Upon paying
the entry fee, a firm draws a productivity pi which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].4 If a
firm does not enter, its payoff is zero. We assume that a worker’s decision whether to acquire
the skill is publicly observable but that a firm’s productivity is its private information.
In the second period, after observing the measure of skilled and unskilled workers, firms
search for workers, and produce if matched with a worker. We assume that search is directed.
To be more specific, there are two markets: one for H workers and one for L workers. If
there are f firms and l workers in a market, then min {f, l} firms and workers are matched
and produce in that market. The remaining unmatched workers or firms do not produce,
and receive a payoff of zero. If a worker of type T is matched with a firm of productivity pi,
they create a positive surplus of 2S (T, pi) and share it equally.5 In order to guarantee that
firms might enter in this market, we assume that c < E [S (H,pi)]. The timing of the model
is shown in Figure 1.
We assume that the function S is continuous and strictly increasing in pi for all T ∈
{L,H}. Skilled workers are strictly more productive than unskilled ones; that is, S (L, pi) <
S (H,pi) for all pi ∈ [0, 1) . Furthermore, we make the following assumptions on the surplus
function S:
4This uniformity assumption is without loss because pi can be always thought of as percentiles of a general
distribution.
5This may be thought of as the result of Nash bargaining with equal powers, such as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), though any fixed division of the surplus would suffice in our static model.
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Figure 1: Timing of Model
t=1
- workers choose type 
T ?  { L,H}
- firms choose to enter 
at cost c
- entered firms draw 
productivity ? ~ U[0,1]
t=2
- firms search for 
workers of type 
T ?  { L,H}  
- matched firms and 
workers share surplus 
2S(T,?)
Assumption 1. S (L, pi) /S (H,pi) is strictly increasing in pi.
Assumption 2. E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi] > E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi] for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Assumption 1 means that production is log-submodular6, and thus the productivity of
a firm substitutes for the skill of the worker. Indeed, this assumption requires that the
surplus of an L-worker grows faster in pi than does the surplus of an H-worker. Assumption
2 implies that the productivity of a skilled worker is not too high relative to that of an
unskilled worker. Specifically, this assumption means that the expected surplus generated
by an unskilled worker conditional on being matched with a firm with productivity larger
than pi is greater than the expected surplus generated by a skilled worker conditional on
being matched with a firm with productivity less than pi.
For concreteness, consider the following production technology:
Example. Let L,H ∈ (0, 1), L < H, and S (T, pi) = T + (α− T )pi. Assumption 1 is
satisfied whenever α is positive. Assumption 2 is satisfied whenever α > 2H − L.
Our objective is to characterize the set of Weak Perfect Bayesian equilibria in this econ-
omy. In equilibrium, the strategies of the firms and workers have to satisfy three sets of
criteria. First, a firm optimally chooses a market in the second stage conditional on its pro-
ductivity. Second, each worker optimally chooses whether or not to acquire a skill. Finally,
each firm makes the entry decision optimally.
Note that if each worker is of the same type, say L, then no worker will be in the H-
market in the second period. As a consequence, when a single worker decides to acquire
the skill, the measure of workers in the H-market is still zero. Therefore, a firm’s choice to
go to the H-market can have a large effect on the search friction. Indeed, if only one firm
enters the H-market it will be surely matched with a worker, but if a second firm enters
the probability of being matched is halved. In order to avoid this problem, we assume that
there is an ε (> 0) measure of workers in each market in addition to those who strategically
decide to be there. We characterize equilibria in the limit where ε tends to zero.
6Note that Assumption 1 can be equivalently stated as ∂ logS (L, pi) /∂pi > ∂ logS (H,pi) /∂pi.
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3 Preliminaries
We first establish some preliminary results which will be useful in characterizing the equi-
libria.
Lemma 1 The expected payoff of each firm is zero in each equilibrium.
The statement of Lemma 1 follows trivially from the unlimited number of firms. Since
entry is costly and the total surplus in the labor market is bounded, some firms do not enter
and earn a payoff of zero. Since firms must be indifferent between entering the market and
staying out, the payoff of the entrants are also zero in every equilibrium.
Next, we show that a consequence of the substitution assumption (Assumption 1) is that
there is negative assortative matching in equilibrium: more productive firms are matched
with unskilled workers and less productive firms are matched with skilled workers.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a firm with productivity pi goes to the L-market in equilibrium.
Then, if pi′ > pi, a firm with productivity pi′ also enters the L-market in that equilibrium.
The intuition behind the statement of this lemma is central for our theory and can be
explained as follows. Since skilled workers generate larger surplus than unskilled ones, there
is always going to be higher demand for skilled workers. In other words, firms face a more
severe search friction in the H-market than in the L-market. Since productivity and skill
are substitutes, the value added of a skilled worker is higher to a low-productivity firm than
to a high-productivity firm. As a consequence, low-productivity firms are more willing to
put up with the search friction in the H-market while more productive firms are willing to
settle for an unskilled worker but guarantee that they are matched with high probability. It
is worth noting the importance of log-submodular production for this result. If production
were log-supermodular, firm sorting would be reversed and workers would always prefer to
obtain the skill.
Proof. Let pT denote the probability that a firm is matched in the T -market. Then a firm
with productivity pi is better off going to the L market if and only if pLS (L, pi) ≥ pHS (H,pi).
By Assumption 1, this inequality implies that pLS (L, pi
′) > pHS (H,pi′) whenever pi′ > pi.
Therefore, a firm with productivity pi′ has a higher payoff in the L-market.
An implication of this lemma is that the equilibrium strategy of the firms in the second
period can be described by a threshold, pi∗. Firms with productivity above pi∗ enter the
L-market and firms with productivity below pi∗ enter the H-market.
We next establish whether firms or workers will be the short side of each market. In
what follows, let µ∗ denote the equilbrium measure of type-H workers.
Lemma 3 In every equilibrium,
(i) there are more firms than workers in the H-market, and
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(ii) if µ∗ > 0 then there are strictly more workers than firms in the L-market.
Proof. To prove (i), recall that there is at least an ε measure of workers in the H-market.
If there were fewer firms than workers in the H market then a firm could enter and achieve
a payoff of E [S (H,pi)]. Since c < E [S (H,pi)], this violates the zero-profit condition (see
Lemma 1).
Conditional on being matched, the payoff of an L-worker is E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi∗]. Similarly,
the payoff of an H-worker is E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi∗] if she is matched. By Assumption 2,
E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi∗] > E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi∗], so an L-worker is strictly better off conditional
on being matched. Note that µ∗ > 0 implies that a worker is weakly better off acquiring
the skill than remaining unskilled, so it must be the case that an L-worker is matched with
a strictly lower probability than an H-worker. An L-worker’s probability of being matched
must therefore be strictly smaller than one. That is, there are more workers in the L-market
than firms.
Assumption 2, which limits how much more productive an H-worker is than an L-worker,
is critical to this result. If instead the skill granted a sufficient increase in expected surplus,
it would be the H-workers who are better off conditional on being matched and part (ii) of
the Lemma would not hold.
Finally we note that the ratio of the unconditional expected surplus for a low-type
relative to the unconditional expected surplus for a high-type worker is smaller than the
ratio conditional on being matched with the most productive firm.
Lemma 4 Assumption 1 implies that
E [S (L, pi)]
E [S (H,pi)]
<
S (L, 1)
S (H, 1)
.
Proof. By Assumption 1 it follows that for all pi ∈ [0, 1):
S (L, pi)
S (L, 1)
<
S (H,pi)
S (H, 1)
.
Taking expectations of both sides with respect to pi yields
E [S (L, pi)]
S (L, 1)
<
E [S (H,pi)]
S (H, 1)
,
which is equivalent to the lemma’s statement.
4 Results
We now turn to the main results. First, we characterize the unique equilibrium for low
entry cost. We show that no worker acquires the skill. Then we turn our attention to higher
entry cost. We show that a positive measure of workers acquire the skill, and that both this
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measure and the fraction of firms in the H-market go to one as entry costs increase, and
may remain at one for an interval of high entry costs.
For expositional ease, we define three cost thresholds:
cL = E[S(L, pi)]
cM =
S(L, 1)
S(H, 1)
E [S(H,pi)]
cH = E[S(H,pi)]
Note that cL < cM ≤ cH , where the first inequality follows from Lemma 4 and the second
one from S(L, 1) ≤ S(H, 1).
4.1 Low entry cost
Our main result establishes that, for low entry costs, no worker becomes skilled in equilib-
rium.
In what follows, let λ∗ denote the equilibrium measure of entrant firms and recall that
µ∗ denotes the equilibrium measure of type-H workers.
Theorem 1 If c < cL then µ
∗ = 0 and pi∗ = 0.
This theorem states that when entry costs are so low that a firm would still enter if it
knew it would be matched with an L-type worker with probability one, then the unique
equilibrium is for all workers and all entrant firms to go to the L-market. If any workers
decided to acquire the skill, then the H-market would be overrun with low-quality firms
hoping to be matched. To avoid this severe selection problem, workers remain unskilled —
despite the fact that they obtain an equal share of the surplus they generate.
We note that workers’ incentives are strict in this equilibrium, that is, a worker strictly
prefers to remain unskilled. This immediately yields the striking result that workers would
be willing to pay a strictly positive amount in order to avoid becoming skilled. That is,
workers endowed with the skill would be willing to pay to actively destroy their human
capital in order to achieve a match with a higher quality firm.
Proof. First, we show that µ∗ cannot be strictly positive in an equilibrium. If µ∗ > 0,
then Lemma 3 implies that there must be strictly more workers than firms in the L-market.
A firm could therefore match with an L-worker with probability one, which implies that
expected post-entry profits must be at least E[S(L, pi)]. This leads to positive expected
profits for c < cL, which contradicts firms’ zero-profit condition.
It remains to show that µ∗ = 0 and pi∗ = 0 is indeed an equilibrium. If a worker deviates
and acquires a skill then she will be matched with the least productive firm. By Assumption
2, S (H, 0) < E [S (L, pi)], so this deviation is not profitable. Since there are no workers in
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the H-market, pi∗ = 0 is a best response of the firms since they can only be matched in the
L-market. Thus µ∗ = pi∗ = 0 is an equilibrium.
Our directed search assumption and non-transferable utility are central to this result. To
understand their importance, suppose instead that the labor market is perfectly competitive
and workers are compensated through marginal product pricing. Assumption 1 would still
imply negative assortative matching and the existence of a cutoff productivity, pic , above
which a firm would hire an unskilled worker. The wages of the skilled and unskilled workers,
wL and wH , would be determined by the indifference condition of this firm:
S (pic, L)− wL = S (pic, H)− wH
This condition implies that wH > wL, and hence, a worker always prefers to be skilled. In
fact, the same conclusion can be drawn about the stable outcome in matching models where
utilities are perfectly transferable.
Now suppose that surplus is shared equally, but search is not directed. For example,
there is just one market for the workers and the maximum number of matches are created.
Then the surplus of a matched worker of type T is E [S (T, pi)]. Again, workers would strictly
prefer to become skilled even at a positive cost. The same argument implies that workers
would obtain the skill if they could direct their search towards particular firm types.
4.2 Intermediate Entry Cost
We now turn our attention to the case where the cost of entry is larger than cL = E [S (L, pi)],
that is, firms would not enter if all workers were unskilled. The next theorem charac-
terizes the unique equilibrium where the entry cost is larger than cL but smaller than
cM = [S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)]. For this range of entry costs, there will be a unique
equilibrium featuring a positive measure of both worker types. An interior equilibrium
(where µ∗, pi∗ ∈ (0, 1)) is defined by the following three constraints:
Worker indifference.— By Lemma 3, a skilled worker is surely matched and, if µ∗ < 1,
there are more workers than firms in the L-market. Note that if λ∗ is the measure of
entering firms, and pi∗ is the productivity cutoff above which a firm enters the L-market,
then λ∗ (1− pi∗) is the measure of firms in the L-market. Therefore, the probability that
an unskilled worker is matched is λ∗ (1− pi∗) / (1− µ∗) and the indifference condition of a
worker is
E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi∗] = λ
∗ (1− pi∗)
1− µ∗ E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi
∗] . (1)
Firm indifference.— Again, by Lemma 3, a firm is matched for sure in the L-market.
The probability that a firm is matched in the H-market is µ∗/ (λ∗pi∗). Therefore, a firm
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with cutoff productivity pi∗ is indifferent between the two markets if
µ∗
λ∗pi∗
S (H,pi∗) = S (L, pi∗) . (2)
Zero-profit condition.— By Lemma 1, the payoff of the entering firm is zero. This
constraint is captured by the following condition.
c =
(
µ∗
λ∗pi∗
)
pi∗E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi∗] + (1− pi∗)E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi∗] . (3)
The left-hand side is the cost of entry. The right-hand side decomposes the post-entry payoff
of the firm depending on whether its productivity is smaller or larger than pi∗. If pi ≤ pi∗,
which happens with probability pi∗, the firm enters the H-market and is matched with
probability µ∗/ (λ∗pi∗). This explains the first term on the right-hand side. If pi > pi∗, which
happens with probability (1− pi∗), the firm enters the L-market and is surely matched. This
explains the second term.
We now characterize the unique equilibrium for large entry costs. In what follows, µ∗ (c),
λ∗ (c) and pi∗ (c) denotes the equilibrium values of the fraction of skilled workers, the measure
entering firms and the cutoff productivity, respectively, if the entry cost is c.
Theorem 2 Suppose that c ∈ (cL, cM ). Then, there is unique equilibrium where µ∗ (c) , pi∗ (c) ∈
(0, 1). In addition, µ∗ (c) and λ∗ (c) are continuous in c and
(i) µ∗ (c) , pi∗ (c)→ 0, λ∗ (c)→ S (H, 0) /E [S (L, pi)] as c→ cL.
(ii) µ∗ (c) , pi∗ (c)→ 1, λ∗ (c)→ S (H, 1) /S (L, 1) as c→ cM .
This theorem states that both the measure of skilled workers, µ∗(c), and the firms’ cutoff,
pi∗(c), converge to zero at cL and to one at cM , and are continuous in between. In other
words, as the entry cost becomes larger, more and more workers acquire the skill and more
and more firms search for them. In fact, there are also more entrant firms at c = cM than at
c = cL. The theorem does not claim that these functions are pointwise monotonic, although
one could provide additional technical assumptions to guarantee monotonicity, for example
as in Section 4.4.
It is worth pointing out that there is a discontinuity in λ∗ at c = cL = E [S (L, pi)].
Recall that Theorem 1 implies that λ∗ is cL/c as long as c < cL. As c converges to cL from
below, the measure of entrant firms go to one. There is an indeterminacy at c = cL. At this
cost, the post-entry payoff of each firm is zero if each worker is unskilled and firms do not
face search frictions. As a consequence, λ∗ can be anything between zero and one. Part (i)
of the theorem states that when c becomes a bit higher than cL, the measure of entrants is
again uniquely pinned down and it is S (H, 0) /E [S (L, pi)]. By Assumption 2, this is smaller
than one, that is, there is a discrete drop in λ∗ at c = cL. On the other hand, part (i) also
implies that the other variables of our interest, µ∗ and pi∗, are continuous at cL.
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Proof. First, we argue that µ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Since, c is larger than cL = E [S (L, pi)], the
entering firms would make a negative profit if µ∗ = 0. If each worker were skilled (µ∗ = 1),
all entering firms would go to the H-market, and the zero-profit condition of the firms would
imply that the measure of entering firms is c/E [S (H,pi)]. The post entry payoff of a firm
with pi = 1 would be
S (H, 1)
E [S (H,pi)]
c
If this firm is matched with an L-worker, its payoff would be S (L, 1). Since c < cM =
[S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)], the firm with pi = 1 would strictly prefer to be matched with
an L-worker for sure. Hence, a worker would have incentive to deviate and remain unskilled.
Note that both (2) and (3) depend on µ∗ and λ∗ only through the ratio µ∗/λ∗. Let x∗
denote µ∗/λ∗.
Next, we show that for all x∗ ∈ [0, S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)] there is a unique pi ∈ [0, 1] which
satisfies (2), that is,
x∗ =
piS (L, pi)
S (H,pi)
. (4)
Note that the right-hand side is zero at pi = 0 and S (L, 1) /S (H, 1) at pi = 1. In addition,
the right-hand side is continuous and strictly increasing in pi (by Assumption 1). Hence, by
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is indeed a unique pi which solves (4). We denote
the solution by pi (x∗). Notice that pi (0) = 0, pi (S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)) = 1 and the function
pi(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Note that pi(x∗) is the optimal threshold for firm
sorting.
Third, we show that for each c ∈ (cL, cM ), there is a unique x∗ ∈ [0, S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]
such that (x∗, pi (x∗)) satisfies the zero-profit condition, (3), that is,
c = x∗E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi (x∗)] + (1− pi(x∗))E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi(x∗)] . (5)
We now observe that the right-hand side of (5) is E [S (L, pi)] when evaluated at x∗ = 0,
while at x∗ = S(L, 1)/S(H, 1) it is [S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)]. Next, we argue that the
right-hand side is strictly increasing in x∗. Suppose that x∗1 < x
∗
2. Then,
x∗1E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi (x∗1)] + (1− pi(x∗1))E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi(x∗1)]
≤ x∗2E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi (x∗1)] + (1− pi(x∗1))E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi(x∗1)] .
The right-hand side would be the post-entry payoff of a firm who enters the L-market if
and only if pi ≥ pi(x∗1) but µ/λ = x∗2. Since the optimal threshold is pi (x∗2) if µ/λ = x∗2, we
conclude that
x∗2E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi (x∗1)] + (1− pi(x∗1))E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi(x∗1)]
≤ x∗2E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi (x∗2)] + (1− pi(x∗2))E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi(x∗2)] .
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The previous two inequalities imply that the right-hand side of (5) is increasing in x∗. Of
course, the right-hand side of (5) is also continuous in x∗. Therefore, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, for each c ∈ (cL, cM ) there is indeed a unique x∗ which solves (5).
So far, we proved that for each c ∈ (cL, cM ), there is a unique x∗ = µ∗/λ∗ which satisfy
(2) and (3). It remains to pin down µ∗ and λ∗. The indifference condition of a worker, (1),
can be written as
1
λ∗
=
(1− pi (x∗))E [S (L, pi) |pi ≥ pi(x∗)]
E [S (H,pi) |pi ≤ pi(x∗)] + x
∗, (6)
which defines λ∗ as a function of x∗. Then we can obtain µ∗, since µ∗ = λ∗x∗. It remains to
show that µ∗ ∈ [0, 1], µ∗ ≤ λ∗pi∗ and λ∗ (1− pi∗) ≤ 1−µ∗. By (4), µ∗ ≤ λ∗pi∗ is satisfied. By
(6), λ∗ (1− pi∗) ≤ 1− µ∗. Finally, λ∗ (1− pi∗) ≤ 1− µ∗ implies that µ∗ ≤ 1 and µ∗ = λ∗x∗
implies that µ∗ ≥ 0.
To prove part (i), suppose that c goes to E [S (L, pi)]. Then, by (5), x∗ converges to zero.
This implies that µ∗ also converges to zero because µ∗ = λ∗x∗. As we pointed out above,
pi (x∗) converges to zero as x∗ goes to zero. Then, by (6), λ∗ converges S (H, 0) /E [S (L, pi)].
To prove part (ii), suppose that c goes to [S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)]. Then, by (5),
x∗ converges to S (L, 1) /S (H, 1). As we pointed out, pi∗ (x∗) converges to one. Then, by (6),
µ∗ converges to one. Plugging pi∗ (x∗) = 1 and x∗ = 1/λ∗ into (5) yields that λ∗ converges
to S (H, 1) /S (L, 1).
4.3 Large Entry Cost
Finally, we characterize the unique equilibrium for the case of large entry cost.
Theorem 3 Suppose that c ∈ (cM , cH). Then there exists a unique equilibrium in which
µ∗ = pi∗ = 1 and λ∗ = E [S (H,pi)] /c.
This theorem states that if the entry cost is large enough then each worker becomes
skilled and all firms search for these workers. The fraction of entering firms is determined
by the zero-profit condition.
Proof. First, we show that the proposed profile (µ∗, pi∗, λ∗) is indeed an equilibrium. In
fact, we show that this is the unique equilibrium in which µ∗ = 1. If µ∗ = 1 then a firm’s
expected post-entry payoff is E [S (H,pi)] /λ∗. By Lemma 1, λ∗ = E [S (H,pi)] /c. The payoff
of a firm with pi = 1 is
S (H, 1)
λ∗
=
S (H, 1) c
E ([S (H,pi)])
> S (L, 1) ,
where the equality follows from λ∗ = E [S (H,pi)] /c and the inequality follows from c >
cM = [S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)]. Notice that the right-hand side would be payoff of the
firm if it enters the L-market and is matched with a worker for sure. So, the firm with pi = 1
strictly prefers to enter the H-market. Then Lemma 2 implies that no firm has an incentive
to deviate in the second stage. Since each firm enters the H-market, workers strictly prefer
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to become skilled. Finally, the entry decisions of the firms are optimal because they make
zero profit.
It remains to show that there is no equilibrium where µ∗ < 1. If µ∗ = 0 then the firm’s
post-entry payoff is at most E [S (L, pi)] < c, so the firms would make a negative profit. We
argue that there is no interior equilibrium, that is, with µ∗ ∈ (0, 1). In the proof of Theorem
2, we showed that (5) must hold in any interior equilibrium. We have also established that
the right-hand side is smaller than [S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)]. As a consequence, (5)
cannot hold if c > [S (L, 1) /S (H, 1)]E [S (H,pi)].
4.4 Example
To illustrate the intuition behind our results, we briefly discuss an example. Consider
S(T, pi) = T + (α−T )pi, with L = 1, H = 3, and α = 7. Then cL = 4, cM = 5, and cH = 5.7
The key equilibrium parameters as a function of c are shown in Figure 2.
For entry costs c > cH , it is not profitable for firms to enter. At the opposite extreme,
by Theorem 1 the unique equilibrium for entry costs c < cL is for no worker to obtain the
skill and all firms to enter the L-market, while λ∗(c) > 1 by firms’ zero-profit condition.
Figure 2: Numerical Example
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By Theorem 2, the unique equilibrium for entry costs cL < c < cM features a positive
measure of workers choosing to obtain the skill, µ∗, and a positive productivity threshold
below which firms enter the H-market, pi∗. Perhaps counterintuitively, the measure of
entrants, λ∗, is increasing in the entry cost c, as the ex-ante probability of being matched
7Note that our model only assumes S(L, pi) < S(H,pi) on the open interval [0, 1), and S(L, 1) = S(H, 1) =
α in this example. Consequently cM = cH . Whenever S(L, 1) < S(H, 1) is additionally assumed, cM < cH .
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with an H-type worker increases. In accordance with Lemma 3, however, there are always
more workers than firms in the L-market and workers than firms in the H-market. As the
cost approaches cM = cH , all three quantities approach one. Moreover, in this example,
λ∗(c) and µ∗(c) are not only continuous in c for intermediate entry costs, but are also
monotonically increasing.
5 Welfare
Although Theorems 1, 2, and 3 establish the relationship between worker skills and firm
entry-costs, the impact on overall welfare is potentially more subtle. This is because, even
though more workers obtain the skill in the intermediate-cost case than in the low-cost case,
some of them will remain un-matched in equilibrium. In the low-cost case, workers did not
obtain the skill but any search frictions were borne entirely by firms.
Theorem 4 Total surplus is strictly higher for c ∈ (cM , cH) than for c < cM . Furthermore,
there exist δ1, δ2 > 0 such that
(i) Total surplus is strictly higher for c < cL than for c ∈ (cL, cL + δ1)
(ii) Total surplus is strictly lower for c < cL than for c ∈ (cM − δ2, cM )
Proof. First, note that the firms’ zero-profit condition means that it is sufficient to focus
only on total worker surplus.
For low costs, i.e. c < cL = E[S(L, pi)], by Theorem 1 no worker obtains the skill.
Furthermore, firms’ entry decision requires that λ = E[S(L, pi)]/c > 1, so that workers are
matched with certainty. Thus worker surplus, and hence total surplus, is E[S(L, pi)].
For high costs, i.e. c ∈ (cM , cH), by Theorem 3 all workers obtain the skill. Furthermore,
firms’ entry decision requires that λ = E[S(H,pi)]/c > 1, so that workers are matched with
certainty. Thus worker surplus, and hence total surplus, is E[S(H,pi)]. Since S(H,pi) >
S(L, pi) for all pi ∈ [0, 1), E[S(H,pi)] > E[S(L, pi)].
For intermediate costs, i.e. c ∈ (cL, cM ), by Theorem 2 there is an interior equilibrium.
The worker indifference condition, (1), implies that worker surplus can be given by the
surplus of H-workers, and is thus E [S(H,pi)|pi ≤ pi∗] < E [S(H,pi)].
If c goes to E[S(L, pi)], pi∗ converges to zero by Theorem 2 and hence total surplus goes
to S(H, 0), which is strictly smaller than E[S(L, pi)|pi ≥ 0] = E[S(L, pi)] by Assumption 2.
Then (i) is implied by continuity of S, pi∗(c) and the expectations operator.
If c goes to [S(L, 1)/S(H, 1)E[S(H,pi)], pi∗ converges to one by Theorem 2 and hence
total surplus goes to E[S(H,pi)]. Then (ii) is implied by continuity of S, pi∗(c) and the
expectations operator.
Theorem 4 shows that total surplus is maximized in the high-cost regime. Intuitively,
all workers obtain the skill in this case and are matched with probability one, and so worker
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surplus is maximized. Perhaps surprisingly, total surplus is not minimized in the low-cost
case, despite the fact that the measure of skilled workers is also minimized. There is a range
of costs in the left tail of the intermediate-cost range where welfare is strictly lower.8 In this
range, the fact that some workers remain unmatched in equilibrium dominates the effect of
increased skill acquisition. Finally, we note that in the intermediate-cost case, total surplus
is continuous and is monotonically increasing if and only if pi∗(c) is monotonic.
6 Conclusion
We have shown an alternative model of inefficient investment in skills based on an as-
sumption of substitutability of quality rather than signaling. Instead of over-investment in
unproductive skills to signal one’s quality to potential matches, we find under-investment in
productive skills in order to avoid low-quality matches. Substitutability of quality between
the two halves of a match creates a selection problem, wherein only the lowest-quality firms
are willing to enter the congested H-type market in search of a scarce H-type worker and
potentially remain unmatched. This congestion is exacerbated as firm entry costs fall —
that is, as the market becomes more competitive. Our main result is to show that when
entry costs are sufficiently low, the selection problem becomes so severe that it shuts down
the H-market entirely and all workers remain unskilled.
While we have focused on the labor market application, the results in this paper are
of course applicable to other instances of directed search. Suppose, for example, that the
surplus from marriage features substitutability of spousal quality. Someone choosing between
pursuing an MBA and an economics PhD (which, given subsequent earnings profiles, may
be considered to reduce his human capital) may actually choose the latter option — knowing
that only a high-quality mate would consider settling for an economics professor rather than
competing over his high-flying financier counterparts.
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